After Japan´s defeat in World War II, the Government General of Korea continued to act in the form of a Post-war Affairs Headquarters to close down the system of colonial rule and to assist the establishment of the US Army Military Government. On Aug. 24, following the declaration of its defeat, the Japanese government, in response to the request of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), set up the ‘Post-war Central Liaison Office´ to continue to deal with work relating to bringing the war to a close. Similarly, the Government General of Korea also launched the ‘Post-war Central Liaison Office´ on Aug. 27 and set up subdivisions that included a general affairs division, a negotiation division, an organization division and a protection division. Of the subdivisions, the protection division was headed by Shiraishi Kojiro, former director of agriculture and commerce at the Government General of Korea. Its tasks included dealing with the repatriation of Japanese citizens, organizational bodies for Japanese citizens remaining behind and the protection of the rights of individuals and corporations. The protection division became a major body that dealt with the repatriation of Japanese and also a key division which oversaw railways and shipping and the administration of refugee camps. The protection division scheduled a year for its operation, and over a ten-month period it planned to repatriate 650,000 Japanese residents in Korea and a further 1.3 million Japanese residents in Manchuria and northern China. It even allocated a 28.8 million-won budget to carry out the mission.

Meanwhile, the Government General designated repatriation trains to convey the Japanese home en masse. Initially, the Seoul-Busan line departing Seoul Station at 6:50 a.m. was the designated repatriation train. On Sept. 10, they added another train that departed Seoul Station at 10:00 a.m. for Busan, allocating two trains a day. They again added one more train that departed from Daejeon. Furthermore, the Government General set up information bureaus that handled repatriation and relief works under the jurisdiction of the protection division. At the information bureaus, special transit certificates were issued to Japanese travelers who wanted to take the repatriation train or ship. The certificate assigned each passenger to a specific train or ship. Priority for the certificates was given to war refugees, women, and families of the staff members of the ‘Post-war Affairs Headquarters.´ For the general public, certificates were distributed on a first-come-first-served basis through government offices such as the local district office. As the number of war refugees increased, certificates for the general public were temporarily suspended. Two pieces of baggage were permitted per person, but most of these were never loaded onto the ship that left from Busan. After Sept. 14, with orders from the US Army Military Government, the loading of luggage was prohibited.

Initially, the information bureaus in Seoul and Busan planned to use Japanese schools only as camp facilities for the repatriates, but, because of the sheer number of repatriates, Korean schools were also used as camps from the end of August. This was still not enough and religious facilities had to be used as well. The information bureau in Busan utilized the Masrao Building across from the Busan Station along with Elementary School No.3, Elementary School No.7, the Community Center, Samdo Girls´ High School and Busan Middle School as repatriate camps. By September, the number of repatriation vehicles fell short and camp facilities were also insufficient, so the customs storage was also remodeled as a camp. To supplement food shortages, flour and rice had to be sent from Seoul.

It is a well-known fact that immediately following liberation, before the US Army Military Government was established, the Government General of Korea dominated the administration of the country, and by issuing an excessive amount of Joseon bank notes, it triggered a rapid inflation in South Korea. On September 30, when the Bank of Joseon was taken over by the US Army Military Government, the amount of Joseon bank notes issued accounted for 8.68 billion won, a 6.4 billion won increase in one year. In particular, from August 15 to September 30, during a one and a half month period, 3.84 billion won worth of bank notes were issued. This action was triggered by a rise in expenditure which included retirement payments for officials and employees of dissolved companies and government offices, along with discharged soldiers of the Japanese military. In addition, Japanese repatriates rushing to withdraw their funds provided a further cause. The Government General not only assisted such withdrawals of funds and remittances but also conducted its ‘post-war affairs´ irresponsibly. This bad management triggered extremely high inflation in the liberated South Korea and seriously damaged the economy. With its responsibilities transferred to the control of the US Army Military Government in late September, the protection division of the ‘post-war affairs headquarters´ was dismantled and the work of the information bureaus was handed over to the Sewa Society for Japanese Citizens, a civilian organization

In the wake of Japan´s defeat, a number of Koreans who had taken up residence in Japan as well as Korean soldiers and workers who had been drafted by Japan began the slow process of returning to their homeland. Unfortunately, accurate repatriation statistics are not available. However, according to data kept by the law enforcement authority of the Japanese government, as of late 1944 the total number of Koreans who were staying or residing in Japan stood at 1,936,843, and Japan's Ministry of Home Affairs estimated the number at 529,907 in September 1947. It is safe to say that approximately 1.4 million Koreans were repatriated from Japan following Japan´s defeat.

In general terms, the records of the Japanese government´s relief organization on the repatriation of Koreans in Japan reveal that the first phase of repatriation, from August to November in 1945, was a period of organizing and establishing a plan, the second phase, from December, 1945 to March, 1946, was a period of preparation, and the third phase, from April to December, 1946, was the period of implementation. During the initial chaotic phase after Japan´s defeat, as Koreans rushed to return to their homeland, there was no organization that had clear responsibility or control over relief efforts and repatriation. In the second phase, the Repatriates Relief Bureau was established by the Japanese government to clarify responsibility for relief efforts and to collect data on repatriation status including statistics on repatriates. Meanwhile, autonomous organizations that had done Korean repatriation work during the first phase began to fade away. During the third phase, the repatriation process was further institutionalized with the registration of foreigners in Japan and surveys to assess the intention of repatriation, and massive transports began to be conducted in a systematic way following orders from the occupation forces.

Accurate statistics on repatriates in the first phase are not available. However, the numbers can be estimated based on the statistics of the second and third phase found in the repatriation data from Japan´s Ministry of Health and Welfare. It is estimated that the total number of repatriates amounted to 1.4 million and we know that the number of Koreans repatriated during the second and third phases were 401,634 and 106,988 respectively. Therefore, the number of Koreans repatriated in the first chaotic phase can be estimated at roughly 900,000. The massive influx of more than 1.4 million repatriating Koreans, at a time when no relief system was in place following Japan´s defeat, is of critical import in understanding not only Korean racial migration, but the history of ongoing relations between the peninsula and Japan.

We must also compare the repatriation measures implemented by the Japanese government before the arrival of occupation forces and the systematic repatriation measures that followed in order to comprehend the character of the Japanese government´s policy on Koreans in Japan. In response to the surge in demand for repatriation after Japan´s defeat, the Japanese government was involved through its local administrative offices, but mostly in a passive manner. The focus was on devising methods to suppress repatriation such as monitoring the activities. The Japanese government took advantage of private groups like Heungsaeng Associations in each district or the League of Korean Residents in Japan, which organized after the liberation, while largely ignoring the danger posed by the disorganized repatriation ships smuggling Koreans across the sea, which were vulnerable to torpedoes as well as all manner of crime and disease.

At the time, most repatriates were referred to as war victims, showing that they suffered after having been taken to Japan by force to work in the war-related industry and had lost their jobs or left homes to return to their homeland in the wake of Japan´s defeat. Reintegration into society proved to be impossible for the many repatriates who were unable to adapt and led unstable lives in dire poverty after returning to their homeland. The issue of restitutions owed to these repatriates by Japanese companies is at the heart of the issue of post war restitutions by Japan.

Once Soviet Union forces joined the Allied forces, Japanese people in Korea began to grow uneasy, but none of them would have predicted the coming defeat as did Japanese in other areas. Rather, they witnessed the defeat in a relatively peaceful atmosphere without actually being in the battleground. However, as the situation on the Korean Peninsula rapidly devolved after Japan´s defeat, Japanese people in Korea began to repatriate, with most of the Japanese who lived in South Korea having completed their return by February, 1946.

Japan´s Ministry of Health and Welfare reported that Japanese people abroad, which included Japanese soldiers, started to repatriate after the defeat, and 6,288,665 were said to have returned to Japan by 1961 when repatriation was nearly complete. This figure includes 596,454 Japanese who repatriated from south of the 38th parallel and 322,585 from north of the 38th parallel. In addition, the data shows that most of these people repatriated during the period from 1945 to 1946. In total, 5,096,323 Japanese had repatriated by late 1946, of which 571,765 reportedly came from South Korea and 304,469 from North Korea. If we include Japanese civilians and soldiers who repatriated from Manchuria via the Korean peninsula, it is estimated that far more than 1 million Japanese repatriated to Japan through Korea. This unprecedented racial migration that took place in such a short time is a key element in fully understanding the modern history of Korea-Japan relations.

The Sewa Society for Japanese Citizens, established by the Japanese Government-General in Korea and the Korean military immediately after Japan´s defeat, oversaw the relief effort for repatriating Japanese and provided them with financial support. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Sewa Society developed close ties with the Post-war Affairs Headquarters of the US Army Military Government of South Korea. Japanese heavyweights in Korea, who played the main role in the repatriation project and were being repatriated themselves, filled the administrative vacuum of the Government General of Korea. Leading figures among them negotiated with the government regarding relief and resettlement aid for repatriates and their overseas assets upon their return to Japan. They also conducted awareness campaigns to raise repatriates´ understanding of repatriation projects.

The prospectus of the Sewa Society starts by saying that “In this rapidly changing environment, in obedience to the Emperor´s order, we must behave ourselves, devote our good faith as loyal retainers, and show moderation as people of a great country. In particular, we have to make full contribution to the glorious development of a new Joseon as a good collaborator. We have to double our efforts to fulfill our duty with composure at home and in the workplace.” This statement provides blatant proof that the influential Japanese in Seoul thought little of the historical change brought by liberation from colonial rule.

The movement to form Sewa Societies spread across the nation as the Government-General of Korea encouraged local government agencies to create self-governing organizations. As to its activities, firstly, the Sewa Society issued a bulletin to serve as a source of information on repatriation. Secondly, it educated children of the Japanese in preparation for repatriation. Thirdly, it carried out medical assistance projects and provided medical supplies for poor Japanese repatriates, guided repatriates to the repatriate reception center and repatriation train stations and also arranged relief transportation. To fund the organization´s administration and relief efforts, the Sewa Society launched fundraising campaigns from the beginning. In August and September after Japan´s defeat, the Sewa Society raised the hefty sum of 17 million yen from organizations such as the Government General of Korea, the Post-war Affairs Headquarters, Joseon Financial Syndicate and the Joseon Food Association. However, these donations were investigated for they violated the ban on cash circulation by public organizations under clause 2 of the law specified by the Military Government Office, and as a result of the investigation, 151,500 yen, a fraction of the donations, was returned that November.

Early in January, 1954, the Japanese Red Cross announced that it was willing to fully cooperate in repatriating Koreans in Japan working with the North Korean Red Cross through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The North Korean Red Cross issued a reply through the ICRC saying that the North was also willing to assist in repatriating a small number of the Japanese people remaining in the country if they wanted to leave. As a result, 36 Japanese people who had been residing in North Korea returned home in April, 1955. Japan claimed that there were 2,061 Japanese living in the North, and that was the end of the Japanese repatriation project between North Korea and Japan.

Then in August, 1954, Nam Il, North Korea´s Foreign Minister, declared that it is the North´s clear policy to recognize Korean residents in Japan as its citizens and protect the rights of Koreans living abroad. This statement was the North´s first public announcement of shift from a passive policy on overseas Koreans to one of recognition of and active engagement with overseas Koreans as Korean nationals living abroad. As a result, in May 1955 a group of Korean residents in Japan who pledged loyalty to North Korea launched the movement to form the “General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon).”

The Red Cross organizations in North Korea and Japan played the leading role in the negotiations over the repatriation of Koreans living in Japan to the North., During these 1955 negotiations over the repatriation of Japanese between the North Korean Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross, North Korea demanded the return of Koreans living in Japan. Their goal was to address the labor shortage at home and to block negotiations between Japan and South Korea over international diplomatic relations. Statements made by Foreign Minister Nam Il in September and December of 1958 said the North was prepared to receive repatriates and renewed its demands that the Japanese government repatriate Koreans living in Japan. Chongryon hailed this statement, designating October 10th as the “Day of Repatriation Request,” and held rallies throughout Japan demanding repatriation while asking political parties including the Japan Socialist Party and various civic groups for cooperation and support for the repatriation project.

At first, the Japanese government maintained a reserved stance, reflecting their concern about the potential negative impact any action might have on negotiation with South Korea. Later on, Japan started to take a more positive attitude with regard to repatriation to North Korea. In December 1958, the Japanese government announced that “regardless of the birthplace of repatriation applicants, we will deal with the repatriation issue in a humanitarian manner from the perspective of international law.” After that, the government gradually made it clear that it would decide to begin repatriating Koreans living in Japan despite staunch opposition from the South Korean government. The Japanese government followed through on its decision to repatriate Koreans to the North and formally announced repatriation as a government policy by passing a vote for the plan in the Cabinet the following February. After a series of negotiations, the North Korean Red Cross and the Japanese Red Cross reached an agreement in June of that year and signed the agreement in Calcutta, India that August. Subsequently, in December, two Soviet ships carrying the first group of 975 Korean repatriates left the Niigata Port of Japan headed for Cheongjin Port in North Korea. A total of 93,412 people were repatriated to the North over the 23 years through 1982 and as many as 2,400 of them were Japanese spouses.

The Japanese government chose to repatriate Koreans to the North at the expense of breaking-off ongoing Korea-Japan talks. Many Japanese supported the government´s decision to “let those who wish to return do as they want,” because most of the Korean residents in Japan at the time were unemployed, and posed a financial burden on Japanese society due to the supplementary living allowances they received. As each local government scrambled to vote for the repatriation, an effective opposition could not be mounted to stop those who pushed for the repatriation in the central government such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The repatriation still stands as a problematic historical issue in Japan among organizations pressing for improvement in human rights in the North and as a sticking point in the upcoming process of normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan.

In its ‘Revolutionary Pledge,´ Park Chung-hee´s military government promised the people a better standard of living and more economic independence, which made them more desperately dependent on Japanese investment than the Democratic Party government was. By the time of the military coup of May 16, 1961, South Korea was mired in a dire economic recession due to a jobless rate that far exceeded 20%. The country had more than 2.3 million people unemployed, food shortages caused by poor agricultural productivity and a low living standard triggered by chronic inflation and rising prices. Accordingly, the military government scrambled to draw up plans to reconstruct the economy immediately after seizing power and announced the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan in January 1962. A total of 680 million dollars of the investment budget appropriated in the five-year scheme was slated to come from foreign investment, most of which would appear in the form of public loans from the U.S. and West Germany. The influx of foreign capital was the key to the five-year plan because it was going to be used in strengthening basic industries and building infrastructure. However, from the first year, the government failed to attract foreign capital to the extent it had anticipated. Therefore, entering 1962, the military government rushed to establish diplomatic ties with Japan as a preliminary step to attract Japanese investment. In November 1962, Kim Jong-pil, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of Korea, and Masayoshi Ohira, Japan´s Foreign Minister, agreed that Japan would provide South Korea with 300 million dollars in grant money and 200 million dollars in credits with compensation (long-term government loans), giving impetus to the negotiations over establishing a diplomatic relationship between the two countries.

The encouragement of the U.S. also played an important role in bringing South Korea and Japan to the negotiating table. At the time that the military government came into power, the Cold War mentality towards Northeast Asia had become increasingly entrenched. Right before Park Chung-hee, chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, visited the North, Davis Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State, had visited South Korea via Japan to confirm unity as allies and urged a quick agreement in the Korea-Japan talks. He said to President Park, “Now that Vietnam is in danger, if we fail in South Korea, it will truly undermine America´s prestige” and reportedly urged the South to promptly reach an agreement in the claims negotiations, saying that rebuilding the worsened economy depended on the results of the economic development plan, and that in particular, South Korea´s claims against Japan was directly connected to the successful execution of the economic development plan and the reconstruction of the economy. Since the mid-1960s, the anticommunist alliance system promoted by the U.S. was growing firm, with the South Korea-U.S. defense pact and the U.S.-Japan defense pact playing two pivotal roles. The active military intervention of the U.S. in Vietnam brought the South and Japan more closely into the East Asia alliance framework led by the U.S. Meanwhile, U.S. influence over the improvement of Korea-Japan relationship had increased, and the support and encouragement of the U.S. paved the way for the Korean government´s move to negotiate directly with Japan.

Korea and Japan successfully negotiated and signed the South Korea-Japan Basic Treaty (the treaty on the basic relationship between the Republic of Korea and Japan) and four additional agreements in June, 1965. The Korean government pushed ahead with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan amid protests against the Korea-Japan talks. Korea received grants from Japan as compensation for its colonial rule but in return deferred its demand for Japan´s apology and individual compensation. One area of dispute in particular centered around agreements made in former treaties signed between the Great Han Empire and the Empire of Japan. The ambiguous wording, “already invalid,” as it was written into the Basic Treaty regarding the former treaties, allowed room for the two countries to have different interpretations about the legal effects of colonial rule. This difference of interpretation has made it hard for the South to lead the Japanese government to admit the illegality of colonial rule up to the present day.

In addition, the Korean government demanded state compensation for the civilian victims of colonization in order to secure more grants from Japan. In the sixth round of talks in 1961 and 1962, Korea estimated that approximately 1.03 million innocent people were conscripted under Japanese rule and requested that suitable restitutions be paid. However, in the 1970s, restitution was paid to the surviving family member of a mere 8,552 of the dead, with no mention of those who had lost their property.

Japan deprived Korea of its independent status at a time when modern nation-states were forming around the globe, thereby creating a widening gap in understanding our shared history. Beginning with the Meiji Restoration, the Empire of Japan has raised doubts about inherent potential within Asia and pushed for modernization under the banner of westernization of Japan. In addition, Japan blamed the sufferings of the people in neighboring countries that were invaded by Western powers on the inferiority of those civilizations and the ignorance of their people, not on imperialistic encroachment. As a result, Japan sought to address its own crisis not by forming alliances with neighboring countries, but by jumping on the imperialist bandwagon and invading them.

Immediately after Japan´s defeat, not only politicians but the general public and the intelligentsia were so caught up in the feeling that they had been victimized that they didn´t pay much attention to facing up to their history of committing harmful acts against Asian countries including Korea. Beginning in the 1960s, some radical intellectuals initiated an effort to reflect upon Japan´s history and, moving into the 1980s, Japanese civil rights activists started to express a sense of shame about their past wrongdoings. It was the issue of the Japanese army´s conscription of comfort women, which was raised in the 1990s, that served as a trigger for some civic groups today to admit that Japan did in fact harm its neighboring countries. Since then, Japanese political circles, influenced by efforts made to reflect on Japan´s past among intellectuals as well as the general public, have begun to apologize to Asia in a reserved manner.

However, the gap between Japan´s perception of history and that of other Asian countries continues to be an important source of conflict. A series of diplomatic conflicts arose out of incidents perceived quite differently by the two countries involved such as Japan´s authorization of conservative history textbooks and the Japanese Prime Minister´s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Japan and other Asian nations have been occasionally involved in discord while maintaining cooperative relations and the fundamental reason for this is that the Japanese government lacks a forward-looking attitude about its history. Unlike the German government, which was determined to hold those to blame accountable in a consistent manner in the years following the end of World War II, sparing no effort in making apologies and offering compensation to war victims, the Japanese government has never formally apologized and nor has it offered sincere compensation to war victims from the moment of defeat up until today. Today, as war victims, who were drafted and conscripted, including young girls who were used as comfort women, are seeking compensatory damages by filing lawsuits against the Japanese government, Japan continues to deny any responsibility for its wrongdoings.

A sincere apology and appropriate compensation from the Japanese government would mean first and foremost that war victims would regain their rights as individuals and, secondly, in so doing, Japan would be declaring that it is determined to prevent any recurrence of the past wrongdoings. Therefore, Japan must show a proactive attitude as a nation in taking responsibility for its history in order to build trust with other Asian countries. If the Japanese government fails to properly remediate its polarizing national attitude towards Asia or show a proactive attitude in reflecting on its history, it can only draw continued distrust and a hostile response from its neighboring countries and its diplomatic efforts to achieve peace and prosperity in the Asian region will be fruitless. Tragically, to our disappointment, Japan continues to turn a blind eye to the facts of history while moving ever further to the right.

This gap in understanding history places the South Korean foreign affairs authorities in a challenging position that requires a wiser and more prudent demeanor in handling relations with Japan. The best way to face trials and tribulations in life is to stick to the basics and maintain a sincere attitude. It doesn´t take a genius to understand that the primary goal of diplomacy is enhancing national interests. Sincerity in diplomatic matters means making a careful approach and utilizing a variety of channels based on their expertise.